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THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF WOODROW WILSON

I

From the time when presidential elections began in the United States people have been interested in the outcome. And there are many who now wonder how voters of the country could have made such a foolish choice as that of last November and what can be the vital forces that gave us a second term of Woodrow Wilson, with his sometimes exasperating moods, his lofty purposes, and world-ideals. Is it a revival of the influence of the Old South in the American nation? Is it the "predestination" of an able Presbyterian layman? Or have we not to do with far-reaching economic and sectional forces and purposes similar to those which have made or unmade presidents from the beginning? The contention of the following paper is that Wilson represents social, sectional, and economic influences more powerful and better grounded in history than most men have been disposed to recognize.

There is something in Wilson which at once recalls the best traditions of the South and suggests the stubborn dogmatism which animated the frontier divines who used to drill doubtful Greek and Latin into the heads of embryo preachers and statesmen. To anyone who knows Calhoun intimately, a conversation with the present chief magistrate suggests the air of that high-toned and stubborn leader. The soft, insinuating voice and the stern unchanging countenance, as one urges a new point of view or dissents from an old one, suggest that most ambitious of all southerners; but Wilson is no follower, even if he is an admirer, of Calhoun. Certainly he is not like Clay, the vivacious and the volatile, the changing and the irrepressible, candidate of the young West. It is rather a cross between Calhoun and an eminent divine of the old-style Presbyterian church that we have before us, both as a leader and as a follower of public opinion. One wonders sometimes which of the

two qualities predominate, just as one wondered many times during the Civil War which of those qualities predominated in Lincoln.

Although a philosopher, he is not a second Jefferson, even if his attitude toward war-stricken Europe does suggest that versatile politician and easy-going statesman. He loves the South, as all the men I have named loved the South; but he would not suffer himself to be wholly southern. The men from that section are not sufficiently worldly-wise to become his closest companions. His idea is to make them leaders of the new nation, as their predecessors were certainly fit leaders of the early republic.

If Wilson is southern and his family have been southerners for generations, he is also western. There was a time when Princeton was the one institution where young and ambitious western youths repaired to learn the truth as it was found in the law and the prophets; where they went to learn how to preach, reform, and lead. Princeton was once the one college of the southern and western up-country, the place where great ideas were warmly received, high purposes were turned into noble deeds, and where life was as simple and as austere as was ever that of the great Calvin himself at Geneva. Wilson is the product of that Princeton and of the West still under the tutelage of Princeton divines. Therefore eloquence as well as urbane manners fit him well. He is southern and western, gentle and sturdy at the same time—a puzzle to our sack-coated generation and an enigma to every foreigner who has met him and tried to fathom his purposes. I am doubtful whether prosperous business men of New York or anxious Englishmen have been more exasperated with him; not acquainted with our history and especially unacquainted with the influences which entered into the make-up of the older generation of American leaders, whether of church or of state, these honest people wonder when they go to Washington what manner of man this democratic aristocrat, this aristocratic democrat, must be.

It is not unfitting that such a man should head the combination of South and West which has now governed the country for four years, four momentous years. It is the first time since James K. Polk that such a combination was really effective; for Buchanan's administration broke down almost at the very beginning. There

was an effort at such a combination in the campaign of 1868, but the popularity of General Grant and the maneuvers of Tammany Hall defeated it; there was another such effort in the election of Tilden, but he was counted out with the consent of both parties. Cleveland was never more than an eastern man, a Republican in Democratic clothes. And hence we come down to 1912 to find the first real representative of South and West in the White House and acting upon southern and western principles. Suppose we trace briefly the history of the sectional alliances which lie behind Wilson and his party, glancing by the way at the opposing combinations of East and Northwest just enough to keep our bearings.


Jefferson won all but four of the electoral votes of the South and West in 1800; and the combination was so popular that it continued in power till 1824. At that time Henry Clay was the one active and pressing candidate of the West for the succession to Monroe, who both feared and distrusted the gallant and self-willed Speaker of the House. But somehow General Andrew Jackson won the hearts of the West and crowded Clay out just at the time when he felt that he must have the presidency. The popular vote of that year was so badly divided among four candidates, Adams from the East, Crawford from the South, and both Clay and Jackson from the West, that the contest was transferred to the House of Representatives, over which Clay presided. I believe that Clay had planned to be Speaker at this particular time and win the presidency from the House because of its peculiar devotion to himself. All the facts point that way. But Jackson's popularity in the West prevented Clay from being one of the three whose names should, by the terms of the Constitution, be submitted to that body. Under these circumstances Clay and Adams undertook to form a combination by which they hoped to govern the country for four years and later make of it a coherent party organization that should long figure in American politics. Clay had a strong and loyal following in Kentucky and Ohio. Adams was peculiarly strong in New England and with industrial interests in New York and Pennsylvania. But Adams labored under the disadvantage of having been denounced by Clay in every western community; and Clay was at a similar disadvantage in New England, where he had been

hated ever since he had forced the war of 1812 on that unwilling section. Nor had Adams failed to add to the weight of this unpopularity of Clay by appropriate attacks upon him during the eight years of Monroe's presidency. The accompanying map (I) shows the area of the Clay-Adams combination. It embraced the whole of New England and the Clay states of Ohio, Kentucky, and Louisiana. Maryland was divided.


The economic program which was designed to satisfy these groups of American life included a high tariff for the East which the West did not want, a moderate internal-improvements system for the West which the East did not care to grant, and a strong national bank for the East which the West hated. The public-land question, which was, in the mind of the West, the first problem before the country, was not to be touched. It was impossible for New England and the West to agree on this subject, the former opposing even further sales of land while the latter insisted on free lands for all who would come and settle on them. It was Clay's famous American system; but it was a weak platform on which to build any combination.

The next four years showed this conclusively, for Jackson, Benton, and Calhoun formed a combination of West and South which rested on a better foundation. Their platform was free lands for the West, which the South did not like; a low tariff for the South, which the West did like; and internal improvements for the West, which the South hated. The bank was not mentioned, or if so, only incidentally. This was not a strong combination, but free lands for the West and free trade for the South promised enough to win Calhoun, and his friends helped Jackson to an almost unanimous vote in Pennsylvania while Van Buren and his machine brought New York into line. Jackson received every electoral vote in the South as well as in the West, including that of Clay's own state. Never did a sectional combination promise so well as that on which Jackson entered office in March, 1829. But underneath the outward appearance of contentment smoldered fires of hottest ambition and economic discontent. Calhoun had been promised the succession, but South Carolina was so impatient for an immediate reduction of the tariff that it was difficult for its leaders to

MAP I
CLAY-ADAMS COMBINATION, 1824



MAP II
SOUTHERN-WESTERN ALLIANCE, 1828



refrain from telling the President that he must act at once. Jackson was not the politician to receive orders. When he failed to reduce the tariff and then began to talk about remaining in office two terms, the extreme southerners broke over the traces.

Then Van Buren, a discreet man, offered himself and all his assistance to help an old and professedly broken man manage affairs in Washington growing more hostile every year to the ways of western leaders. The offer was accepted with thanks and the suggestion went round that the astute New Yorker would make a good successor to the General when his two terms were out. Van Buren proved willing; and rumor, more than ordinarily strong on this point, had it that Benton was to succeed Van Buren in 1844. That would have been a beautiful arrangement. It left Calhoun out altogether, for the most loyal politician could hardly think of waiting more than sixteen years!

The interesting thing to the student is the way Jackson and his group of astute leaders ignored Clay and the East; but it could hardly have been otherwise, for neither Clay nor Adams could ever do other than fight that rough old vandal, Jackson. So bitter became the war that nothing which the South and West had planned to do was done, although Jackson did destroy the bank before he left office. Van Buren's and Tyler's terms as President were little else than armed neutralities. They did little but wrangle. The country was distressed by a great economic crisis and men sometimes lost faith in the Republic. John Quincy Adams actually urged its break-up into two sections and he found twenty-one members of Congress to sign an appeal to that effect.

Out of the deadlock a young senator and rather reckless speculator and politician, Robert J. Walker of Mississippi, led the way. His way was a second combination of the South and the West. He proposed to annex Texas to satisfy the lower South, to seize all Oregon to please the Northwest; if these two sections united, he would reduce the tariff to suit the older South and the older West, states like Virginia and Kentucky; and next, he would grant liberal ship subsidies to the East in the hope of building up a great commercial interest there to counterbalance the industrial group. And finally, he would open China and Japan to the trade of New York


and Boston. The agreement was struck at Baltimore in 1844 and James K. Polk, an able politician and an austere Scotchman, not unlike Woodrow Wilson, was made President as the result.

Clay was again a candidate for the presidency and thoroughly convinced that he would defeat his upstart rival in public leadership. But Polk received a plurality of thirty-five thousand votes and was inaugurated the following March. Unlike Jackson, he had not received all the electoral votes of the West and South. Ohio, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Kentucky were not in the *bloc* of states which supported the new policies. Otherwise the combination held. The imperious lower South and the ardently expansionist Northwest were united. It was the rawer elements of American life that sustained Polk. And these elements knew quite as well what they wanted as did the more cultured and sophisticated East.

Polk was a minority President, as was Woodrow Wilson during his first term. But he gathered around him one of the ablest cabinets we have ever had and he carried out every large item of his program. The legislation of 1845 to 1849 reminds the historian of the legislation of 1913 to 1917 except that Polk had a majority only of the House in his favor during his first two years and, "repudiated" in the congressional elections of 1846, he had both House and Senate against him when he went out of office. He had in that respect a more difficult task than Wilson has had; yet he took the tariff out of politics; he settled the old and vexed question of whether there should be a great national bank; the internal-improvements issue which had been a bone of contention since 1816 was likewise disposed of till after the Civil War, except as it cropped out later in the policy of appropriating public lands for the building of railroads.

Wilson, with a little more than 40 per cent of the total vote of the country behind him, but with large or safe majorities in both houses of Congress, seems to have taken the tariff out of politics; and he has settled even more satisfactorily the national financial system in the Federal Reserve act which, like the subtreasury system of Polk, distributed over the country the money resources of the government. In foreign policy there is no comparison, except

MAP III
ELECTION OF POLK, 1844



(Maryland apportioned. New York voted for Polk, but Clay and Birney received a majority of the popular vote.)

that foreign relations were in both administrations the most important questions before the country.

A glance at the map will show what were the social elements that sustained Polk. It was the lower South, whose leaders were hostile to all protective tariffs, and the region we now call the Middle West, the poorer and least worldly-wise people of the country, that carried through the far-reaching legislation of that critical time. For thirty years the East, where the best-educated people lived, had demanded a monopoly of the vast and growing domestic market. Henry Clay had tried in vain to help them realize that demand, although by doing so he divided his own West, and was never able to regain the love and support of the majority of the people of that section. Still the East retained enough of the home market to secure an unprecedented industrial development in the years which followed Polk; and the South and West voted ship subsidies and found other markets for American products in such liberal measure that our carrying trade was fast crowding that of England off the seas when civil war ruined all.

Polk and his relatively backward groups in the life of the time did thus legislate for the East better than the East could have legislated for herself. Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings was the wisdom of the East confounded. Corn at ten cents a bushel and cotton at ten cents a pound made unequal yoke fellows, but they proved a better team than industry supported by a high tariff and national banking with the monopoly of the public deposits. It has often proved exceedingly unwise to allow the trained, the specialist, and the wise to govern. The instincts and the prejudices of ignorant men have many a time served the growing American nation better than the learning and the experience of those who have "arrived" socially and economically.

Despite the advent of the Whigs to power in 1848, all the policies of Polk and his southern-western combination were continued, and in 1852 Pierce came to leadership, leaning on the same national props that had sustained Polk. But the privileged southerners, the wise and the learned element of this combination, grew rich and foolish. Their northwestern brethren, drawn to them in so many ways, were compelled to set up housekeeping for themselves.


Lincoln became their leader. The self-centered South, doubling its income every decade, would not allow such ignorance to guide them. Relying upon their superior wisdom, they went out of the Union. Never was greater blunder, for the simple democracy of Lincoln and the instincts of plain wheat farmers were the best guaranties in the world for their protection against their bitter enemies in New England.

The *bloc* on which Lincoln rested his administration did not include more than 40 per cent of the voters, and he found himself compelled before a year of the war had passed to abandon the party which had elected him. There was not enough of the West in sympathy with the East on which to build a majority till the war drew to a close. For the East, the moment its leaders found themselves in control of the machinery of government, demanded, first, a monopoly of the national finances, such as they had enjoyed from 1816 to 1836, and, second, a monopoly of the domestic market, which Clay and Adams had failed to secure.

The stress of war compelled Lincoln to yield in the national banking measures of 1862 and in the tariff laws of 1864. The men of the East loaned the government hundreds of millions at rates of interest a third higher than they asked of private business concerns, and before the end they had a strangle hold on the finances of the country. At the same time many, if not most, of the industries of the East made an annual profit of 40 per cent during the long struggle, and at the end they insisted on increasing their protection against all possible outside competition. Alienation of East and West thus began at the very beginning of the war. At the end only the blundering of President Johnson and the popularity of General Grant prevented a return of the West to its former ally, the South, now chastened of slavery and poor enough to make an agreeable yokefellow.


When Grant retired, the two sections united their strength and their interests, and elected Samuel J. Tilden, only to have him counted out. Then the East and the Northwest managed to get on together a little better. The Northwest was becoming industrial on a large scale and the profits of eastern control of the national finances were beginning to be shared with Cleveland, Detroit, and

MAP IV
ELECTION OF 1860



Unshaded area represents territories

MAP V
ELECTION OF 1876




Chicago. The real West moved beyond the Mississippi. Minnesota, Iowa, and Kansas became the natural allies of the South.

Not until William J. Bryan arose on the crest of a wave of western discontent in 1896 was there again chance of a successful combination of the elements of the national life such as had put Polk and Pierce in office. The tariff was still an issue of vital importance in the South; the national finances were the point of attack for the West—the new West, one might say. Tariff and financial reform had animated the Jackson era; they were quite as animating in 1896. The policies of the United States somehow have not changed greatly in all the long years of a century of development. The land question was of similar import; it still appears as a vital matter in the conservation policies of the progressives of all parties.

But the Bryan campaign deserves further notice. It was a crusade. The South and the West were bent on wresting control from the East, and to do so they appealed to social forces and prejudices as old as the country. Jefferson had been elected by the same kind of people who now shouted for Bryan; the East saw the full meaning of the struggle and its leaders hated Bryan quite as cordially as their predecessors had hated Jefferson. The elemental forces of the country were stirred. Millions of money were spent to defeat the combination; some of the best students think that it was never actually defeated, among others the first historian of the country. There was grave danger in the issue, although I cannot but believe that success would have sobered the best of the men around Bryan and prevented the adoption of more radical measures than Jefferson in a similar situation had inaugurated.

It was a significant thing, though, for southern and far western states—for the poor of the old South, where a new hat was an event in the average household, and the poor of the West, where live stock and grain would not sell for enough to pay their freight to market and the interest on the cost of the land on which they were grown—to get together. Their association is shown in the map of the vote (Map VI), but their feelings of kinship cannot thus be expressed. Although western men talked of the glories of the Civil War, they did not hate the cotton farmers; and the southern men

MAP VI
ELECTION OF 1896



began to think that after all Lincoln had been their kind of man. Sympathy and the will to understand each other were the results of the spectacular "first battle," as Bryan put it.

McKinley understood the strong tendency and the aims of his opponents. He fraternized or tried to fraternize with the southerners and he made much good feeling. His efforts were, however, regarded simply as tributes to southern loyalty and to their chances of success in a future campaign. The Spanish War came and southerners volunteered in surprising numbers. Still nobody changed his vote. The combination of East and older West, of New England, Middle States, Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, and the Lake states of Michigan and Wisconsin did not offer anything to them. They still felt rich when they got a new suit of clothes. Big cotton and tobacco crops were made every year, but no substantial profits were left in any of the old states which made up the country from the Potomac to the Rio Grande. Yet the local merchant, when he went on in the autumn to New York to "lay in" his supply of goods for the ensuing year and renew the little credit he had, saw wonderful riches on every hand. From Baltimore to New York magnificent villas adorned almost every hilltop; the trains ran between rows of houses and factories and the country homes of the rich.

By some process all the riches of a great country were being heaped up in the narrow region about New York. Wall Street was a wonder to him. To be known there would have turned his head and perhaps caused him to vote the Republican ticket at the next election. But there were so few of the merchants who ever had their names starred in Bradstreet's *Guide* that they could never have carried an election. Moreover, if such merchants had changed their votes and thus deserted the Lord's chosen people, they would have rapidly lost their trade till honorable mention in Bradstreet's would have proved an empty honor. No; the returning merchant went back to his people, in most cases, wondering if the westerners were not in the same position that he was. He resolved to remain true to the solid South and pray for better western co-operation. This was the spirit of the older men who had seen Lee and Jackson; it was the spirit of their sons who had dreamed of a

new day when Bryan had risen in the West and held out a friendly hand.

II

Joe Wheeler might win honors in a new national war and Fitz Lee might be *persona grata* at the White House, but the average southerner only shrugged his shoulders and bided his time. Roosevelt came to office. He scourged the great men of the East with his sharp tongue; he called them malefactors of great wealth; he talked about the great West and played the cowboy; he even boasted of his Georgia mother and the heroic bravery of the men who "wore the gray." All to no purpose. Southern men still held true and hoped that he might not demoralize the men of the West, their only hope. Charles Francis Adams, who had led the first regiment into Richmond in 1865, went South in 1908 to warn men against Bryan and his "isms." But only a few men in Richmond who enjoyed credit on Wall Street or who were on the directorates of big business paid any attention to the distinguished New Englander. Every southern state voted just the same for the "thrice repudiated candidate."

The more Roosevelt attacked the rich men of the East the more the southerners saw in their loyalty to Bryan a true southern trait, for southern men do not readily desert one in whom they have put their trust. The only way for the East to win the South was to take them in on the "ground floor" of their big business deals, their tariff schedules, their railway underwritings, and their financial operations. But that would be giving away the very thing that it was desired to conserve; moreover, one does not give bonus stocks to men who have no money or receive poor men to one's bosom. A few men, shrewd senators from Virginia and cotton-mill men from the Carolinas, did make alliances with the East, and they are millionaires. But before 1912 one could count the millionaires in any southern state on the fingers of one hand. The South was an outlying province in American life, increasing a little in riches, building skyscrapers in a few of their cities, and putting on, in rare instances, some of the *mores* of New York. In Washington its representatives were laughed at, the more since they still wore the expressions

of countenance that had been in good form when Jefferson Davis was in the Senate.

In fact, these members of Congress did not know very much of the ways of the world, not so much as some of their constituents; they spoke a language which reminds one of Shakespeare's plays; wore clothes that would have been in style among Englishmen of the early Victorian age; and their little devices for saving money, for making a small income reach a long way, were pathetic. The New Willard was a palace whose purview would have bewildered them; a boarding-house with tall, narrow windows, high ceilings, and antique sliding doors was more to their taste, and more adaptable to their purses. And they liked better to discourse of olden times with elderly ladies who had kept boarders since Lincoln's time, with the statuesque widows of senators and congressmen who had been stranded half a century in the nation's capital.

This was not exactly the South that was to elect Woodrow Wilson, but these men were the solid and immovable pillars of the Democratic strength. The emancipated of the South, the men who wore well-cut sack suits, neat shoes, and the best of up-to-date hats, preferred Underwood, the business man's candidate, or Harmon, the Wall Street entry. The money and the mills, the banks and the railroads, of the South were afraid of the pedagogue. He might have theories of the tariff, of money and trade, which might prove bad form in the head of a great country. And Wilson, the president of Princeton, the new Princeton and the home of rich men's sons, of the luxurious clubs, and exclusive circles, was for a time on the side of the big battalions in American life. What college president was ever otherwise. It is the business of the heads of great schools to be *persona grata* with the men who count. Wilson was a good college president. Indeed, this quality was for a long time a rock of offense to the South.

When George Harvey deserted his own "hand-picked" candidate as an ingrate, as one who did not recognize the rules of the game as played in New York, the South became enthusiastic. Wilson was a true southerner then. Had he not married a member of a fine old Georgia family? Was he not reared in Columbia, one of the most southern of all southern communities? He was born

in an antique manse in Staunton, Virginia, he had lived in Wilmington, and he had attended Davidson College, North Carolina. Then he was a graduate of the University of Virginia and of Princeton University as well. If he had set out with the avowed purpose of becoming the South's candidate for the presidency, he could not have accumulated a better collection of experiences and recommendations. Nor was Princeton a handicap. Many an old-fashioned southerner still remembered Nassau Hall, and twice a year got out his old dress suit in which he had graduated and carefully examined it to see whether the moths or Father Time were working the greater havoc.

Come to think of it, Wilson had an asset in the Princeton affiliations, not excepting his close friendship with Cyrus McCormick, who, although a trust magnate in the West, was, after all, a Virginian proud of his pedigree. One thing remained to give the Princeton man his chance before the historic Baltimore convention, and that was to win the support of Bryan. For sixteen years the South had voted for the Nebraska leader and prayed as it voted, in spite of Mr. Taft's *bon mot* to the contrary. If Bryan gave his support to Wilson, few southern delegations would be able to withstand the pull of his influence. Even men of Virginia, where Wall Street had its strongest pocket boroughs, would stampede to him, Senator Martin and Delegate Thomas Ryan to the contrary notwithstanding. Bryan gave the word at last and Wilson was nominated.

But in the ensuing election he received majorities only in the South and one far southwestern state. It was the division of the Republican party which gave him the presidency. The total vote of the Democrats was only about 40 per cent of the whole; but he had the moral support of a much larger body of the people than this election made evident. It was, after all, a combination of the South and West that gave him his strength. The older generation of these two sections were fully conscious of the combination, and they had dreams of the great things that might now be done.

Wilson had a better support than Polk had behind him when he inaugurated the policies which endured to the end of the old southern régime. He took hold of his task in a similarly vigorous way. The tariff, now a hoary institution, was promptly reduced. The

national financial system, quite as dangerously chaotic as it had been in 1845, was even more radically reformed in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. The immense financial power hitherto concentrated in New York was distributed over the country, and a stability was thus given to our monetary system which it had never before enjoyed.

And so on through the whole story. The national income tax for which South and West have wrestled these twenty years; the repeal of the Panama canal tolls act, which called into question our good faith in the world; the rural credits act, which endeavors to open the way to independence to farmers and tenants of other men's lands; the child labor law, that all forward-looking men have favored for a generation; and even the proposed ship-subsidy bill, all point the way to a new economic era, and they find their support in western and southern districts. This is not to say that patriotism is a matter of geography; it is only to assert what is evident to all that the majorities on which the Wilson régime depends come from the regions that have been trying to gain control of the nation since 1896. There are men in the East who see good in this provincialism of clergymen and out-of-date politicians; and there are southerners who have outgrown the poverty of the nineties and who laugh at Wilson and his moralities. There are western men and newspapers of influence who do not understand a government which cannot be induced to pluck a ripe apple from another man's orchard. But on the whole, the people who laugh at Wilson, ridicule his phrases, and resist his measures to the limit of their power dwell in the region of a certain island in the East which bears the savage name of Manhattan.

But when one comes to the foreign policy of this unfortunate combination of South and West is one's amazement aroused. It announces to the world, for the first time in history, I believe, that the government of a great nation refuses to serve as collecting agent for capitalists who take a notion to try their luck in the so-called backward countries. In other words, if you think you can make a fortune in South America, go with all good wishes and invest your savings; but if you get into trouble and do not get 10 per cent on your venture, do not ask us who stay at home to

send navy and army to your assistance. The blood of the people is worth more than concessions and interest on invested money.

To say to Japan "Keep out of China," or to urge the open door for a freer trade everywhere, belies our retention of the Philippines, and so we prepare to set up the islands for themselves, hoping that Japan and England and Germany will join us in a guaranty of their neutrality. We want other nations to keep hands off all American lands; if so, we must keep hands off the Far East. That is a wonderful thing in the world's diplomacy. It is provincial America that believes in and asserts the astounding doctrine.

Thus Woodrow Wilson had made his hand plain to the sections of the country, thus he had made a program in all its essential points, when the European avalanche came and well-nigh broke his power to charm. Europe declared that the rule of might was the rule of right, and eastern Americans, as soon as they recovered from the stun of universal war, seized the occasion to attack the theorist in Washington. Everything he had done seemed to win popular support, the combination of South, the "poor, backward South," and bouyant, unsophisticated West, seemed to be invincible or threatened to become so.

Men remembered now that Wilson had only won 40 per cent of the popular vote in 1912, that he was a minority President, and plans were laid to make an end of the Democratic combination. The East and the West must be reconciled. A candidate must be found who would hold all the states from Pittsburgh to Boston, and such a one was found. Then a candidate must be found who had never seriously alienated the men of the Northwest. Such a one was found and both appeared in one and the same person. Of course the nomination went to that man. He was without a doubt the best who could have been enlisted as a leader, only he did not believe in undoing the things that had been done in Washington. The problem, therefore, was to make a clear-cut issue.


The tariff was offered, but little evidence was found that any new administration would risk a repeal of the Underwood law. Then the impotence of the United States in Mexico was held up as a standing disgrace, and many good men urged a "clean-up" of that

tangled situation; yet in the election it was seen that every border state, the ones that were supposed to be most in danger, returned majorities for the continuation of the rule of misrule in the neighboring republic. Had not Europe demonstrated what blood and iron mean in history? Only New York and Philadelphia seem not to have seen.

The last and great issue of the campaign against the South and West as governing agencies was that of preparedness. Every ounce of weight and influence that could be summoned was cast lustily into the scales. Had not the smug westerner heard the guns at Liège? Would not the southerner, so famous in warfare, come out and fight for his own country, or at least prepare for a fight? This was the strongest case that the East could possibly have made, for many men of all sections felt that something must be done. They did not agree that Belgium could ever have armed successfully against seventy million Germans; but somehow they thought that perhaps there was truth in the old saying that in time of peace one must prepare for war, not realizing that if one arms, one's enemies likewise arm. And they voted against the combination which put Wilson in office.

Still, the program of tariff reform, the new banking law, the income tax, the rural-credits bill, and the "golden rule" in foreign affairs "looked good" to the majority of the sections which had originally seen in the preacher-politician of Princeton a new leader and the promise of a better future. Every southern state Bryan had ever carried and some western states that had never voted for him, Ohio and California for example, adhered to the new leader. The result was a majority of the electoral votes and a plurality of five hundred thousand in the popular verdict. If the preparedness issue had not been available, one may conjecture that the result would have been as overwhelming as that of 1832, if not so overwhelming as that of 1804. The provincialism of West and South is about to become the wisdom of the East. The map (VIII) of the vote shows how strong an appeal has been made; a drawing that showed the vote of each party in states like Minnesota in the West and Massachusetts in the East would make plain how much greater the victory might have been.

MAP VIII
ELECTION OF 1916



Woodrow Wilson and the measures he has made into law as well as the things he contemplates are rooted deeply in the history of the country. The combination which some have regarded as new and ominous is the result of a long series of efforts; it is a recurrence of the conditions of earlier party history quite as much as the promise of a new and fresher American idealism. If the South voted solidly in the minority for half a century in order finally to have its day, the East, which has been in power during most of that long period, has the same promise of a return of victory if its ideals and its purposes are the kind which command the loyalty of common folk—if they are aimed at the uplift of the masses of eastern men. It may be taken as almost certain that the leaders of the present régime will soon enough lift their heads above the people who have made them and begin to legislate for special interests, and then the days of their usefulness will have been numbered. It has ever been thus in our history; why shall it not continue to be so?

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